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 NOTE 
It’s Probable: Missouri Constitution Article 
I, Section 15 Requires a Higher Standard to 
Obtain a Warrant for Real-Time or 
Prospective CSLI 
Aaron Hadlow* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
There are more active cell phones in the United States than there are 
people.1  Law enforcement officers often use electronic communication data 
during criminal investigations to surveil suspects.2  Law enforcement officers 
 
* B.A., Philosophy, Missouri State University, 2011; J.D. Candidate, University of 
Missouri School of Law, 2018.  I would like to extend my gratitude to Professor 
Bowman, whose early guidance and valuable ongoing feedback as faculty advisor 
steered this Note in a more favorable direction; the editorial board members of the 
Missouri Law Review, who I am humbled to associate with as colleagues, and whose 
suggestions unquestionably improved this Note in ways I could not on my own.  I 
extend particular thanks to Bradley Craigmyle, Ben Levin, Jack Downing, Tom 
Wright, Emily Mace, and the many Law Review members whose labors in footnote 
checking are greatly appreciated.  I thank my family for their continued support, es-
pecially my wife Rebekah, whose love is given without hesitation and whose confi-
dence I share in every endeavor. 
 1. According to an annual survey conducted by the CTIA, an organization rep-
resenting the wireless communications industry, wireless subscribers equaled 115.7% 
of the U.S. population.  Annual Wireless Industry Survey, CTIA, 
http://www.ctia.org/your-wireless-life/how-wireless-works/annual-wireless-industry-
survey (last updated Oct. 2016) [hereinafter CTIA Survey].  In December 2015, there 
were an estimated 377.9 million wireless subscriber connections.  Id. 
 2. In 2015, the U.S. district courts in Missouri authorized fifty-six wiretap ap-
plications, primarily for monitoring the content of electronic communication data on 
cell phones.  OFFICE OF ADMIN., WIRETAP REPORT 2015 tbl.2 (Dec. 31, 2015), 
http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/data_tables/wiretap_2_1231.2015.pdf 
[hereinafter WIRETAP REPORT 2015].  These applications, however, only incorporate 
those applications by law enforcement made under the Wire and Electronic Commu-
nications Interception and Interception of Oral Communications Statute.  Id.; 18 
U.S.C. §§ 2510–2522 (2012).  They do not incorporate applications for CSLI under 
The Stored Communication Act.  Id. §§ 2703–2712.  Applications granted under § 
2703 are included in a separate report for delayed-notice search warrants.  Id. § 2703.  
Data reported for § 2703 applications are only available through 2014, when the U.S. 
district courts in Missouri authorized 191 delay-notice search warrants.  OFFICE OF 
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are able to do so because cell phone ownership is nearly universal.3  Cell 
phones emit signals to the nearest cell phone tower every seven seconds.4  
Once the signal is received by the cell tower, it is recorded in signal logs, 
which are stored by cell service providers.5  This information is called “cell-
site location information” (“CSLI”).6  Under federal statute, law enforcement 
may access these records as both historic data and as real-time CSLI.7  His-
toric CSLI is a record retained by the cell service provider of the cell phone’s 
signal transmissions to cell towers.8  Real-time CSLI is the data “stream[ed] 
continuously” by a cell phone to a cell tower.9  In most cases, an authorized 
governmental authority can access this information without knowledge of the 
phone’s user.10 
The scope of this Note primarily deals with issues surrounding real-time 
CSLI, although the issues implicated by article I, section 15 of the Missouri 
Constitution could apply to historic CSLI as well.  Part II of this Note dis-
cusses general principles of Fourth Amendment law and the Supreme Court’s 
treatment of searches and seizures in relation to electronic communications 
and data.  It then discusses the statutory developments empowering law en-
forcement to use emerging technologies for surveillance purposes.  Part III 
discusses recent developments in search and seizure law.  It then discusses 
Missouri’s recent amendment to its constitution, which provides additional 
protections for electronic communications and data.  Part IV discusses the 
impact of recent legal developments on CSLI and law enforcement practice. 
 
 3. There are an estimated 8.1 billion devices connected wirelessly worldwide.  
See Over 8 Billion Connected Devices Globally, IHS Says, IHS MARKIT (June 10, 
2016, 6:40 AM), http://news.ihsmarkit.com/press-release/technology/over-8-billion-
connected-devices-globally-ihs-says.  On average, there are four wireless devices per 
household across the globe.  See id. 
 4. Alison Healey, Answering the Call: The Latest News on Tracking Individuals 
via Their Cellular Phones, FED. L. ENFORCEMENT TRAINING CTRS. 1, 
https://www.fletc.gov/sites/default/files/imported_files/training/programs/legal-
division/downloads-articles-and-faqs/research-by-
subject/miscellaneous/TrackingIndividualsviaTheirCellularPhones.pdf (last visited 
Mar. 26, 2017).  There are more than 307,000 cell tower sites located in the United 
States.  CTIA Survey, supra note 1. 
 5. Healey, supra note 4. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
 8. 1 JAMES G. CARR, PATRICIA L. BELLIA & EVAN A. CREUTZ, LAW OF 
ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE § 4:88 (Aug. 2016). 
 9. Id.  Some courts have held that only five minutes need to pass to change real-
time CSLI to historic.  See State v. Perry, 776 S.E.2d 528, 535 (N.C. Ct. App. 2015). 
 10. Under 18 U.S.C. § 2703, a delayed-notice warrant is often issued.  Delay-
noticed periods may be extended in practice indefinitely.  18 U.S.C. § 2705 (2012). 
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II.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
Part II is broken into three parts.  Part A reviews the general principles 
of Fourth Amendment law.  Part B discusses the Supreme Court’s develop-
ment of surveillance law under the Fourth Amendment.  Part C sketches the 
development of the modern surveillance statutory scheme under which Mis-
souri law enforcement operates. 
A.  Fourth Amendment General Principles 
The Fourth Amendment has two clauses.  The first clause (the search 
and seizure clause) reads: “The right of the people to be secure in their per-
sons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, 
shall not be violated . . . .”11  The second clause (the warrants clause) reads: 
“and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the per-
sons or things to be seized.”12  A seizure is “some meaningful interference 
 
 11. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 12. Id. (emphasis added).  James Madison’s originally proposed amendment 
during the 1787 Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia seemed to intend that these 
two provisions be conjunctive, so that a reasonable search and seizure was necessarily 
conditioned upon the fulfillment of hard warrant requirements. 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, 
SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 1.1(a) (5th ed. 
2016).  Madison’s proposal read: 
 
The rights of the people to be secured in their persons, their houses, their pa-
pers, and their other property, from all unreasonable searches and seizures, 
shall not be violated by warrants issued without probable cause, supported by 
oath or affirmation, or not particularly describing the places to be searched, or 
the persons or things to be seized. 
 
Id. (quoting 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 452 (1789)).  Madison’s inclusion of the phrase 
“shall not be violated by warrants issued without” would appear to authorize all “un-
reasonable searches” if accompanied by any warrant, regardless of whether it was 
issued with probable cause, or the other warrant requirements.  This was surely the 
opposite of what Madison intended.  A more logical reading of Madison’s proposal 
given the historical context is that Madison intended hard warrant requirements for all 
searches and seizures.  These hard warrant requirements were even maintained 
through committee alterations.  Id.  However, the committee chairman reported the 
eventually adopted Fourth Amendment language, despite a majority of the committee 
voting against it, which includes the above-emphasized “and No warrants” language, 
which has been interpreted as separating the unreasonable search and seizure provi-
sion from the warrant requirement provision.  Id.  The “and No warrants” wording 
was included, over Constitutional Convention committee objection, to clarify the 
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with an individual’s possessory interests in that property.”13  A search within 
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment has never been explicitly defined by 
the Supreme Court of the United States.14  However, law enforcement’s ac-
cess of CSLI has for many years been treated as a search.15  Prior to 1967, the 
Supreme Court generally held that, in order for a search to occur, within the 
meaning of the Fourth Amendment, there had to be some physical intrusion 
into a “constitutionally protected area.”16  Constitutionally protected areas 
were limited to those enumerated in the text of the Fourth Amendment.17  
This was known as the trespassory doctrine.18  In 1967, the Supreme Court 
turned away from this approach in Katz v. United States.19 
In Katz, Charles Katz was convicted of transmitting wagering infor-
mation by telephone across state lines in violation of federal gambling laws.20  
During trial, recordings of Katz’s phone conversations were admitted into 
evidence.21  The evidence was obtained after FBI agents had attached an 
“electronic listening and recording device” to the outside of the public tele-
phone booth that Katz used to place the incriminating phone calls.22  The 
Supreme Court was called on to determine whether the evidence was ob-
tained in violation of the Fourth Amendment and therefore erroneously ad-
 
 13. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984).  Black’s defines a sei-
zure as “[t]he act or an instance of taking possession of a person or property by legal 
right or process.”  Seizure, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 14. 1 LAFAVE, supra note 12, § 2.1(a) (“The Supreme Court, quite understanda-
bly, has never managed to set out a comprehensive definition of the word ‘searches’ 
as it is used in the Fourth Amendment.”).  LaFave offers a traditional definition that 
has been used by several appellate courts.  “Search” is said to imply: 
 
some exploratory investigation, or an invasion and quest, a looking for or 
seeking out.  The quest may be secret, intrusive, or accomplished by force, 
and it has been held that a search implies some sort of force, either actual or 
constructive, much or little.  A search implies a prying into hidden places for 
that which is concealed and that the object searched for has been hidden or in-
tentionally put out of the way.  While it has been said that ordinarily searching 
is a function of sight, it is generally held that the mere looking at that which is 
open to view is not a “search.” 
 
Id. § 2.1 (quoting 79 C.J.S. Searches and Seizures § 1 (1952)). 
 15. See United States v. Graham, 796 F.3d 332, 344 (4th Cir. 2015), adhered to 
in part on reh’g en banc, 824 F.3d 421 (4th Cir. 2016). 
 16. Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 512 (1961). 
 17. These enumerations included “‘persons,’ including the bodies and clothing of 
individuals; ‘houses,’ including apartments, hotel rooms, garages, business offices, 
stores, and warehouse; ‘papers,’ such as letters; and ‘effects,’ such as automobiles.”  1 
LAFAVE, supra note 12, § 2.1(a) (footnotes omitted). 
 18. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949 (2012). 
 19. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
 20. Id. at 348. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
4
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mitted into evidence.23  The Court dismissed the State’s argument that the 
search was permissible under the Fourth Amendment because there was no 
physical trespass.24  Instead, the Court ruled that “the Fourth Amendment 
protects people, not places.”25 
In Katz, Justice Harlan articulated in a concurrence the two-part test 
now known as the Katz test: “[F]irst[,] that a person have exhibited an actual 
(subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one 
that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”26  The Katz ruling re-
quired law enforcement to obtain a warrant under the probable cause standard 
in order to conduct similar surveillance activities in the future.27 
While Katz was a turning point in Fourth Amendment search doctrine, 
Supreme Court case law relating to the warrant clause of the Fourth Amend-
ment has followed its own line of development.  Given the practical realities 
of the work of law enforcement, a number of exceptions to the warrant re-
quirement have been carved out over the years.28  However, courts always 
prefer that police officers obtain a warrant before a search.29  Federal Rule of 
Criminal Procedure 41, which most surveillance statutes refer to for warrant 
requirements, generally tracks the language of the Fourth Amendment, re-
quiring the warrant to (1) describe the identity of the person or property to be 
searched or seized, (2) be issued by a magistrate judge or a judge of a state 
court of record, and (3) be served within a specified time period no longer 
than fourteen days after issuance.30 
If some governmental act is deemed a search within the meaning of the 
Fourth Amendment, then regardless of whether it falls under an exception to 
the warrant requirement, it must be supported by probable cause.31  Probable 
cause has its own definitional difficulties.32  Generally, probable cause evalu-
ations use a multi-factor, objective test: “[W]ould the facts available to the 
officer at the moment of the seizure or the search ‘warrant a man of reasona-
 
 23. Id. at 349–50. 
 24. Id. at 353. 
 25. Id. at 351. 
 26. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 27. Id. at 358–59 (majority opinion). 
 28. For information regarding exigent circumstances, see Michigan v. Fisher, 
558 U.S. 45, 47 (2009) (emergency aid); Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 460 (2011) 
(imminent destruction of evidence); United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 42–43 
(1976) (hot pursuit); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925) (border 
searches); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762–63 (1969) (protective searches). 
 29. 2 LAFAVE, supra note 12, § 4.1(a). 
 30. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(e). 
 31. 2 LAFAVE, supra note 12, § 3.1(a). 
 32. Id. § 3.2(a).  The Supreme Court held in Illinois v. Gates that “probable 
cause is a fluid concept − turning on the assessment of probabilities in particular fac-
tual contexts − not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules.”  
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232 (1983). 
5
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ble caution in the belief’ that the action taken was appropriate.”33  Determin-
ing whether sufficient evidence exists to support probable cause depends on a 
balancing test, weighing the invasiveness of the privacy interest against the 
nature of the immediacy at hand.34 
B.  Historic Surveillance Law Cases 
As demonstrated in Katz, warrant and probable cause requirements in 
surveillance cases can raise interesting questions when criminals try to out-
pace law enforcement in the utilization of new technology. 
The next major35 development in surveillance law came in two beeper 
cases decided a year apart.36  In United States v. Knotts, a beeper was hidden 
in a vat of chloroform that was used to locate a 3M employee who had stolen 
the chemical for purposes of manufacturing methamphetamine.37  Law en-
forcement was able to closely follow the employee and locate the employee 
by using a monitoring device that captured the beeper’s signal.38  Once the 
signal was determined stationary at a secluded cabin in rural Wisconsin, po-
lice surveilled the cabin and secured a search warrant.39  Law enforcement 
did not track the movement of the vat inside the cabin.40  Later, evidence of 
the warrantless monitoring of the vat was admitted at trial.41  In applying 
Katz, the Supreme Court held that that the governmental surveillance at issue 
amounted to the following of an automobile on public streets and highways, a 
place where the defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in his 
 
 33. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21–22 (1968) (quoting Carroll v. United States, 
267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925)).  See also 2 LAFAVE, supra note 12, § 3.2(a).  In Brinegar 
v. United States, the Supreme Court held that probable cause determinations require 
“‘less than evidence which would justify’ . . . conviction,” but “more than bare suspi-
cion.”  Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949) (quoting Locke v. United 
States, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 339, 348 (1813)). 
 34. 2 LAFAVE, supra note 12, §§ 3.2(a), (e). 
 35. In the 1970s, the Court issued equivocal rulings on the probable cause re-
quirement within the domain of state surveillance law.  Compare United States v. 
U.S. Dist. Court for E. Dist. of Mich., S. Div., 407 U.S. 297, 323–24 (1972), with 
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745–46 (1979).  Noticeably different in Smith v. 
Maryland was the operation authorized under the Pen Registers and Trap and Trace 
Statute, a legislative response to the Court’s Fourth Amendment doctrine, which had 
made it increasingly difficult for law enforcement to surveil suspects by means of 
telephonic communication.  See Smith, 442 U.S. at 737.  In Smith, the court held that 
no search or seizure occurred.  Id. at 745–46. 
 36. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983); United States v. Karo, 468 
U.S. 705 (1984). 
 37. Knotts, 460 U.S. at 277. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. at 278. 
 40. Id. at 285. 
 41. Id. at 279. 
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movements.42  It further held that the defendant did not have a subjective 
expectation of privacy.43  Since the search satisfied both prongs of the Katz 
test, the Court concluded there was no unreasonable search at issue.44 
United States v. Karo presented the Supreme Court with another case 
involving law enforcement’s use of a beeper hidden inside a container of 
ether.45  The Court resolved the question left open by Knotts: whether the 
initial installation of a beeper in a drum of chemicals was a search when the 
drum was delivered to a buyer who had no knowledge of the hidden beeper.46  
Again applying Katz, the Court found that the recipient of the chemical drum 
had no subjective or reasonable expectation of privacy at the time of the in-
stallation of the beeper because he did not have possession of the drum at the 
time.47  Further, whatever reasonable expectation of privacy the recipient had 
was diminished when he consented to the possibility of something – includ-
ing a beeper – being inside the drum that was not supposed to be there upon 
transfer of possession.48 
The Supreme Court emphasized that although the installation of the 
beeper did not constitute a search or seizure under Katz, it was still possible 
that an illegal search took place if the drum was monitored in a place the re-
cipient did have an actual or reasonable expectation of privacy, such as his 
residence.49  The Court further held that monitoring such devices required a 
warrant but left open the possibility of exceptions under exigent circumstanc-
es.50 
Knotts and Karo represent the Supreme Court’s approach to cases where 
law enforcement uses digital signals to locate suspects, an approach the Court 
used for the next quarter century. 
 
 42. Id. at 281. 
 43. Id. at 282. 
 44. Id. at 285.  The Court’s opinion, however, noticeably neglected the pressing 
issue of the warrantless installation of the beeper, which is noted in the concurrences 
of Justices Brennan, Blackmun, and Stevens.  Id. at 285–86 (Brennan, J., concurring).  
This issue was resolved in Karo.  United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 711 (1984). 
 45. Karo, 468 U.S. at 708. 
 46. Id. at 711. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. The Court noted, “This case thus presents the question whether the monitor-
ing of a beeper in a private residence, a location not open to visual surveillance, vio-
lates the Fourth Amendment rights of those who have a justifiable interest in the pri-
vacy of the residence. . . . [W]e think that it does.”  Id. at 714. 
 50. Id. at 714–15, 718.  Exigent-circumstances doctrine instructs “that emergen-
cy conditions may justify a warrantless search and seizure, especially when there is 
probable cause to believe that evidence will be removed or destroyed before a warrant 
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C.  Modern Surveillance Statutory Scheme 
Surveillance law in Missouri operates under the federal statutory 
scheme.51  CSLI is accessed by law enforcement officers under a federal law, 
the Stored Communications Act (the “SCA”).52  The SCA requires compa-
nies, after receiving a proper application, to disclose the “contents” or “rec-
ords” of electronic communications.53  An “electronic communication” is 
“any transfer of signs, signals, writing, images, sounds, data, or intelligence . 
. . transmitted . . . by a wire, radio, electromagnetic, photoelectronic[,] or 
photooptical system.”54  Importantly, an electronic communication expressly 
does not include “any communication from a tracking device.”55 
The “contents” of an electronic communication are distinguishable from 
the “records” of an electronic communication.56  “Contents” are defined as 
“any information concerning the substance, purport, or meaning” of an elec-
tronic communication, and contents are obtained under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2703(a) 
and (b).57  The contents of a communication are more relevant to issues in-
volving wiretapping than location tracking.58  While not expressly defined 
under the SCA, “records” presumably extends to any information, retained by 
the cell service provider, that might not otherwise fall under the definition of 
“contents.”59  Records are obtained under 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c).  The SCA’s 
records provisions are relevant to the present discussion of CSLI because 
contents deal only with an electronic communication’s meaning, and CSLI is 
merely data related to the electronic communication.60 
There are five ways that electronic communication records, like CSLI, 
may be subject to compelled disclosure by and to law enforcement under the 
 
 51. While Missouri Revised Statutes sections 542.400–542.420 provide local law 
enforcement the ability to initiate a wiretap, state surveillance law is outdated by 
modern technology and limited to “wire communications.”  MO. REV. STAT. § 
542.400 (Cum. Supp. 2013).  “Wire communications” are defined as “any communi-
cation made . . . through the use of facilities for the transmission of communications 
by the aid of wire, cable, or other like connection.”  Id. § 542.400(12).  While it is 
unclear whether “or other like connection” could be extended to mean cell towers, 
practically the statute is unused.  In 2015, no Missouri court granted a surveillance 
order under the statute.  WIRETAP REPORT 2015, supra note 2, at tbl.2. 
 52. The Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2701–2712 (West 2017). 
 53. The SCA incorporates the definitions under 18 U.S.C. § 2510.  Id. § 2711(1).  
Further, 18 U.S.C. § 2703 requires electronic communication providers to turn over 
the “contents” of electronic communications under qualified circumstances.  Id. § 
2703(a). 
 54. Id. § 2510(12). 
 55. Id. § 2510(12)(C).  A “tracking device” is defined in 18 U.S.C. § 3117(b). 
 56. The “contents” of an electronic communication are distinguished from “rec-
ords” of an electronic communication in 18 U.S.C. § 2510(8). 
 57. § 2510(8).  See also id. §§ 2703(a)–(b). 
 58. See CARR, BELLIA & CREUTZ, supra note 8, § 4:78. 
 59. See 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c). 
 60. See CARR, BELLIA & CREUTZ, supra note 8, § 4:78. 
8
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SCA, although only two are relevant for the purpose of this Note.61  First, 
under § 2703(c)(1)(A), law enforcement may compel disclosure of electronic 
communication records when a warrant is obtained pursuant to federal or 
state rules of criminal procedure.62  Second, under § 2703(c)(1)(B), law en-
forcement may compel disclosure under a court order.63 
Warrant procedures for electronic communication records sought under 
§ 2703(c)(1)(A) are no different than other warrants and thus are subject to 
the same constitutional requirements.64  Probable cause must then be shown 
under § 2703(c)(1)(A).65  If the warrant is sought before a federal court, the 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure expressly require a showing of probable 
cause to obtain a warrant “to search for and seize a person or property or to 
install and use a tracking device.”66  Under this rule, a tracking device is de-
fined as “an electronic or mechanical device which permits the tracking of the 
movement of a person or object.”67 
However, if law enforcement does not have the necessary evidence to 
make the required probable cause showing, then it may obtain CSLI under the 
second method of § 2703(c)(1)(B), which has a lower standard.68  Courts 
have held that this lower statutory standard is constitutionally permissible 
because the third-party disclosure doctrine applies to electronic communica-
tion records.69  The third-party doctrine instructs that an individual does not 
have a reasonable expectation of privacy when that individual voluntarily 
 
 61. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c). 
 62. Id. § 2703(c)(1)(A).  If seeking a warrant in state court, then applicable state 
rules of criminal procedure govern, while if seeking a warrant before a federal court, 
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure operate.  Id. §§ 2703(a)–(b).  Since most 
warrants issued for required records disclosure under the SCA are sought in federal 
court, this Note primarily focuses on the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure when 
relevant discussion arises.  See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
 63. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(1)(B).  Section 2703(c)(1) also provides that a record 
may be disclosed with the consent of the customer, for purposes of investigating a 
telemarketing scheme or when the information sought relates to billing information.  
Id. §§ 2703(c)(1)(C)–(E). 
 64. Section 2703(c)(1)(A) relies on “the procedures described in the Federal 
Rules of Criminal Procedure (or, in the case of a State Court, issued using State war-
rant procedures).” Id. § 2703(c)(1)(A).  Courts have held that search and seizure pro-
visions of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure “embod[y] standards which con-
form with the requirements of the Fourth Amendment.”  United States v. Haywood, 
464 F.2d 756, 760 (D.C. Cir. 1972). 
 65. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41 lays out the requirements of obtaining 
a warrant in federal courts.  FED. R. CRIM. P. 41. 
 66. Id. at 41(d)(1). 
 67. The rule adopts the definition of a tracking device as found in 18 U.S.C. § 
3117(b).  FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(a)(2)(E). 
 68. See, e.g., In re U.S. for an Order Authorizing the Release of Historical Cell-
Site Info., 809 F. Supp. 2d 113, 115 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (holding “[t]his showing is 
lower than the probable cause standard required for a search warrant”). 
 69. See, e.g., United States v. Graham, 824 F.3d 421, 427 (4th Cir. 2016). 
9
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discloses information to third parties.70  As a result of this exception to the 
constitutional probable cause requirement, under § 2703(c)(1)(B),  a court 
order for disclosure of CSLI need only be supported by a standard of “specif-
ic and articulable facts” that show “reasonable grounds to believe” that the 
record is “relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation.”71  Im-
portantly, a court order issued pursuant to § 2703(c)(1)(B) is expressly pro-
hibited if it is in contravention of state law.72 
CSLI is sometimes sought by law enforcement under joint authority of 
the Pen Registers73 and Trap and Trace Devices74 Statute, 18 U.S.C. §§ 
3121–3127.  The Pen Registers Statute was amended in 2001 by the USA 
PATRIOT Act to include “signaling information” as part of its definition of 
pen registers.75  However, the Communications Assistance for Law Enforce-
ment Act of 1994 (“CALEA”) provides that “call-identifying information” 
obtained under the Pen Registers Statute “shall not include any information 
that may disclose the physical location of the subscriber.”76  The legal stand-
ard under the Pen Registers Statute to obtain electronic communication rec-
ords is even lower than the SCA’s standard.  Law enforcement requesting an 
order to establish a pen register or trap and trace device need only show the 
information “likely to be obtained . . . is relevant to an ongoing criminal in-
vestigation.”77  However, some courts have held that law enforcement seek-
 
 70. The third-party disclosure doctrine is the view that a subject surrenders 
Fourth Amendment protections by revealing information to a third party.  Orin S. 
Kerr, The Case for the Third-Party Doctrine, 107 MICH. L. REV. 561, 563 (2009). 
 71. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (2012). 
 72. Id. (“In the case of a State governmental authority, such a court order shall 
not issue if prohibited by the law of such State.”). 
 73. A pen register is a device or process that “records or decodes dialing, rout-
ing, addressing, or signaling information transmitted by an instrument or facility from 
which a wire or electronic communication is transmitted,” as long as the transmission 
does not include contents.  Id. § 3127(3). 
 74. A trap and trace device “captures the incoming electronic or other impulses 
which identify the originating number or other dialing, routing, addressing, and sig-
naling information reasonably likely to identify the source of a wire or electronic 
communication, provided, however, that such information shall not include the con-
tents of any communication.”  Id. § 3127(4). 
 75. In re Application of U.S. for Order, 497 F. Supp. 2d 301, 306 (D.P.R. 2007) 
(discussing the legislative history of the Communications Assistance for Law En-
forcement Act and the Pen Registers Statute). 
 76. 47 U.S.C. § 1002(a)(2)(B) (2012). 
 77. 18 U.S.C. § 3123(a)(1).  It is not immediately clear whether the standard laid 
out under the Pen Registers Statute is higher, lower, or the same as the standard under 
the SCA.  The SCA requires the government to offer “specific and articulable facts” 
showing “reasonable grounds” that the information sought would be relevant to an 
ongoing criminal investigation.  Id. § 2703(d).  The Pen Registers Statute merely 
requires the government to certify that the information “likely to be obtained” is rele-
vant.  Id. § 3123(a)(1).  The offering of “specific and articulable” facts requirement, 
which requires the government to detail its reasonable belief that the sought records 
10
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ing real-time CSLI cannot do so under CALEA – meaning CALEA can only 
be used to collect historic CSLI.78 
Federal courts across the country have disagreed about the necessity of a 
warrant supported by probable cause for obtaining real-time CSLI.  Some 
courts have held under the third-party disclosure doctrine that accessing real-
time CSLI is not an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment be-
cause there is no objective expectation of privacy.79  Other courts have held 
that the third-party disclosure doctrine does not apply because users do not 
voluntarily choose to share their location information with their service pro-
viders.80  Courts in the First,81 Second,82 Fourth,83 Fifth,84 Sixth,85 Seventh,86 
 
will be relevant, is more strenuous than a mere government certification that the rec-
ords are “likely” to be relevant.  Id. 
 78. See United States v. Espudo, 954 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1043 (S.D. Cal. 2013) 
(holding that a warrant sought under the hybrid standards of the SCA and Pen Regis-
ters Statute must be supported by probable cause because CALEA’s legislative record 
does not support a hybrid theory interpretation of CALEA). 
 79. See, e.g., In re Smartphone Geolocation Data Application, 977 F. Supp. 2d 
129, 136 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (holding that cell phone users agree to be tracked because 
of the general public’s awareness of geolocation tracking on cell phones, along with 
cell phone users’ agreements with service providers and manufactures terms).  See 
also United States v. Salas, No. 1496, 2013 WL 4459858, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 16, 
2013) (holding that the third-party disclosure doctrine applies to CSLI). 
 80. See State v. Andrews, 134 A.3d 324, 351 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2016) (holding 
that the third-party disclosure doctrine is “ill suited to the digital age” and that cell 
phone users do not “voluntarily convey” information to service providers (quoting 
United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 417 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring))). 
 81. See, e.g., In re Applications of U.S. for an Order Authorizing Continued Use 
of a Pen Register & Trap & Trace With Caller Identification Device, 530 F. Supp. 2d 
367, 368–69 (D. Mass. 2007) (holding that the SCA was a sufficient standard for 
historic CSLI, but not for real-time or prospective data, which required a probable 
cause showing for required disclosure). 
 82. United States v. Lambis, 197 F. Supp. 3d 606, 611 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (holding 
that law enforcement needed an independent warrant supported by probable cause to 
use a cell-site simulator to obtain real-time CSLI). 
 83. In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Authorizing Disclosure of Loca-
tion Info. of a Specified Wireless Tel., 849 F. Supp. 2d 526, 541 (D. Md. 2011) (hold-
ing that probable cause must be shown to obtain a warrant for real-time CSLI because 
cell phone users keep their phone “on their person when conducting daily activities” 
and that cell phone users have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their move-
ments). 
 84. In re Application of the U.S. for an Order for Authorization to Obtain Loca-
tion Data Concerning an AT&T Cellular Tel., 102 F. Supp. 3d 884, 895–96 (N.D. 
Miss. 2015) (noting the cautious approach of a U.S. Attorney who sought a warrant 
supported by probable cause “pending clarification regarding the applicable constitu-
tional standards in the prospective cell phone data context”). 
 85. United States v. Powell, 943 F. Supp. 2d 759, 778 (E.D. Mich. 2013). 
 86. In re U.S. for an Order Authorizing the Disclosure of Prospective Cell Site 
Info., No. 06-MISC-004, 2006 WL 2871743, at *5 (E.D. Wis. Oct. 6, 2006) (holding 
11
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and Ninth Circuits have required a warrant issued on probable cause before 
police can collect real-time CSLI.87  But courts within the Tenth88 and Elev-
enth89 Circuits only require the fulfillment of one of the lesser standards ar-
ticulated in the SCA or Pen Register Statutes.  Circuit courts that have ad-
dressed the issue of CSLI include the Fourth,90 Sixth,91 and Eleventh92 Cir-
cuits.  The Eighth Circuit has not addressed the issue of Fourth Amendment 
searches and real-time CSLI under the SCA.93 
Despite the discordant body of case law surrounding the issue of CSLI, 
recent developments at the Supreme Court and corresponding reactions by 
state legislatures appear to be trending in favor of individual digital privacy 
interests. 
III.  RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 
Part A of this section first discusses recent developments in case law 
that have potential bearing on the issue of Missouri surveillance law and elec-
tronic communications and data.  Part B of this section then discusses Mis-
souri’s recent constitutional amendment to article I, section 15. 
A.  Relevant Case Law Developments 
Whether the monitoring of real-time CSLI is a search under the Fourth 
Amendment is an open question under Supreme Court jurisprudence.  Rele-
vant developments involve the Supreme Court’s recent consideration of the 
nature of Global Positioning System (“GPS”) information,94 as well as a law 
enforcement search of a cell phone incident to arrest.95 
 
that the lesser standards of the SCA and Pen Registers Statute were insufficient to 
support a warrant seeking to obtain CSLI). 
 87. In re Application for Tel. Info. Needed for a Criminal Investigation, 119 F. 
Supp. 3d 1011, 1039 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (holding that the third-party disclosure doctrine 
did not apply because cell phone users do not generally consent through privacy poli-
cies to the warrantless acquisition of CSLI). 
 88. United States v. Takai, 943 F. Supp. 2d 1315, 1323 (D. Utah 2013) (holding 
that warrant exceptions applied in emergency circumstances). 
 89. United States v. Booker, No. 1:11–CR–255–1–TWT, 2013 WL 2903562, at 
*7 (N.D. Ga. June 13, 2013). 
 90. United States v. Graham, 824 F.3d 421, 427 (4th Cir. 2016). 
 91. United States v. Carpenter, 819 F.3d 880, 888 (6th Cir. 2016). 
 92. Davis v. United States, 785 F.3d 498, 511 (11th Cir. 2015). 
 93. The Eighth Circuit has analyzed emails under the SCA.  See United States v. 
Bach, 310 F.3d 1063, 1068 (8th Cir. 2002) (holding that a search and seizure of 
emails conducted by technicians as directed by law enforcement was not a violation 
of the Fourth Amendment); Anzaldua v. Ne. Ambulance & Fire Prot. Dist., 793 F.3d 
822, 842 (8th Cir. 2015) (holding that sent and draft emails were not “stored” within 
the meaning of the SCA). 
 94. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 402 (2012). 
 95. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2480 (2014). 
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In United States v. Jones, the Supreme Court returned to issues relating 
to law enforcement’s use of tracking devices.96  In Jones, the Court held that 
a warrantless attachment of a GPS tracking device to a vehicle was an unrea-
sonable search under the Fourth Amendment.97  The investigating officers 
obtained a warrant authorizing the use of an electronic tracking device on the 
suspect’s wife’s Jeep.98  However, the officers failed to install the device 
during the period authorized by the warrant.99  Undeterred, law enforcement 
installed the GPS device a day after the period lapsed.100  Law enforcement 
then tracked the suspect’s movement for the next twenty-eight days.101 
Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia resurrected the trespassory test 
often used by the Supreme Court prior to Katz.  Scalia argued that the Katz 
test was an addition to – not a substitute for – the common law trespassory 
test.102  Scalia reasoned that the Katz test would still apply in situations in-
volving “merely the transmission of electronic signals without trespass.”103 
In concurrence, Justice Sotomayor raised concerns about the application 
of the third-party disclosure doctrine in the context of surveillance and elec-
tronic communications.104  Also writing in concurrence, Justice Alito argued 
that the trespassory test presented numerous problems105 in a digital age.106  
He further argued that even the Katz test might be inadequate to address pri-
vacy concerns arising from the monitoring of electronic devices.107  Finally, 
 
 96. Jones, 565 U.S. at 404. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. at 402–03. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. at 403. 
 102. Id. at 406–07.  Scalia read Knotts and Karo to support this argument because 
neither case questioned the unauthorized installation of a beeper by law enforcement 
(Knotts) or a third party (Karo).  Id. at 409. 
 103. Id. at 411. 
 104. Id. at 416 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
 105. First, the majority’s disregard for the use of GPS for purposes of long-term 
tracking, instead emphasizing the “relatively minor” attachment of the GPS to a vehi-
cle.  Id. at 424–25 (Alito, J., concurring).  Second, the majority’s approach leads to 
“incongruous results,” in that if police attach a GPS to a vehicle, then the Fourth 
Amendment applies, but if the police follow the vehicle “for a much longer period 
using unmarked cars and aerial assistance,” then there are no Fourth Amendment 
issues.  Id. at 425.  Third, under the majority’s approach, the “coverage of the Fourth 
Amendment may vary from state to state” based upon the state’s approach to commu-
nity property.  Id. at 425–26.  Some “non-community-property” states would interpret 
the registration of the Jeep in the wife’s name as presumptive evidence that the wife 
was the sole owner.  Id. at 426.  Finally, the majority’s approach fails to account for 
cases of involuntary transmission of electronic signaling, such as tracking a vehicle 
by activating stolen vehicle detection systems or potentially CSLI, because no physi-
cal touching of the property has occurred.  Id. 
 106. Id. at 418. 
 107. Id. at 426–27. 
13
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he suggested that the most effective way to check the surveillance power of 
the government was through legislation.108 
Two years later, in Riley v. California, the Supreme Court unanimously 
rejected the incident to arrest warrant exception for searches of data on cell 
phones.109  Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Roberts emphasized the 
unique nature of the cell phone, based on its enormous capacity to store in-
formation and the nature of the information stored on a cell phone.110  Rob-
erts outlined the intimate nature of stored cell phone data, potentially ranging 
from sexual preferences to personal concerns about one’s health.111  Im-
portantly, Roberts saw that the search of stored data on a cell phone could be 
far more invasive than the search of a home.112  Roberts echoed Sotomayor’s 
concern in United States v. Jones, writing that cell phone location information 
is standard on most modern phones “and can reconstruct someone’s specific 
movements down to the minute, not only around town but also within a par-
ticular building.”113  The Supreme Court’s ruling in Riley recognized a long-
vocalized concern regarding the nature of privacy in a digital age. 
B.  Article I, Section 15 
In 2014, Missouri amended article I, section 15 of the Missouri Consti-
tution to read, 
That the people shall be secure in their persons, papers, homes, ef-
fects, and electronic communications and data, from unreasonable 
searches and seizures; and no warrant to search any place, or seize any 
person or thing, or access electronic data or communication, shall is-
sue without describing the place to be searched, or the person or thing 
to be seized, or the data or communication to be accessed, as nearly as 
may be; nor without probable cause, supported by written oath or af-
firmation.114 
The amendment came before the public for a vote upon the legislature’s 
initiative.115  Upon first introduction, the legislature’s bill summary read that 
prior to issuance, a warrant “must describe the data or communication to be 
 
 108. Id. at 429–30. 
 109. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2485 (2014). 
 110. Id. at 2489–90. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. at 2490–91. 
 113. Id. at 2490. 
 114. MO. CONST. art. I, § 15 (emphases added). 
 115. S.J. Res. 27, 97th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2014). 
14
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 82, Iss. 2 [2017], Art. 9
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol82/iss2/9
2017] IT’S PROBABLE 497 
accessed and be supported by probable cause.”116  The language of the pro-
posed amendment remained unchanged throughout the legislative process.117 
By passing the amendment, Missouri voters became the first state to en-
shrine protections for electronic communication and data in their constitu-
tion.118  In a media report following the passage of the amendment, the bill’s 
original sponsor, Senator Robert Schaaf, noted that the amendment’s legal 
impact would “take time to sort out,” but the legislative intent was to afford 
electronic communications and data the same protections provided to other 
enumerations of “person, paper, home, and effects,” as provided under article 
I, section 15.119 
While the Supreme Court of Missouri has yet to substantially address 
the amendment to article I, section 15, the Missouri Court of Appeals, West-
ern District, has discussed the implications of the new “electronic communi-
cations and data” provision in a context unrelated to CSLI.120  In State ex rel. 
Koster v. Charter Communications, Inc., the Western District interpreted the 
recent amendment as having no effect on current search and seizure law.121  
The court held that “article I, section 15, even as amended, is not currently 
measurably more restrictive on the government than is the Fourth Amend-
ment.”122  The Supreme Court of Missouri has traditionally read article I, 
section 15 to be “coextensive” with the Fourth Amendment.123 
However, these interpretations of article I, section 15 do not negate the 
clear requirement of a warrant supported by probable cause when law en-
forcement seeks electronic communications and data.  This requirement of 
probable cause extends to disclosure requests sought under § 2703(c) of the 
SCA for purposes of monitoring real-time CSLI, despite the SCA’s articulat-
ed standard of “specific and articulable facts” for the reasons set forth in the 
next section. 
 
 116. Id. 
 117. Compare S.J. Res. 27, 97th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2014) (pre-
filed Dec. 1, 2013, version), with S.J. Res. 27, 97th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 
2014) (enacted). 
 118. Becca Stanek, Missouri Passes Constitutional Amendment to Protect Elec-
tronic Privacy, TIME (Aug. 6, 2014), http://time.com/3087608/missouri-electronic-
privacy-amendment/.  A number of other states have since implemented statutory 
measures affording similar protections to electronic communications and data.  State 
Laws Related to Internet Privacy, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Jan. 5, 2016), 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-information-technology/state-
laws-related-to-internet-privacy.aspx. 
 119. Stanek, supra note 118. 
 120. State ex rel. Koster v. Charter Commc’ns, Inc., 461 S.W.3d 851, 857–58 
(Mo. Ct. App. 2015). 
 121. Id. at 858.  The Western District wrongly interpreted the effect of the 
amendment on article I, section 15 by neglecting long-practiced rules of constitutional 
construction.  See Pestka v. State, 493 S.W.3d 405, 408–09 (Mo. 2016) (en banc).  
See also infra Part IV.A. 
 122. Charter, 461 S.W.3d at 858. 
 123. State v. Hosier, 454 S.W.3d 883, 892 n.6 (Mo. 2015) (en banc). 
15
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IV.  DISCUSSION 
Article I, section 15 requires a warrant supported by probable cause for 
purposes of monitoring real-time CSLI because the provision is broader in its 
scope of protections than the Fourth Amendment.  Article I, section 15 is 
broader in its scope of protections than the Fourth Amendment both on its 
face and because of its legislative purpose.  The legislative purpose of the 
amendment defeats the warrant exception for real-time CSLI under the third-
party disclosure doctrine because CSLI is qualitatively a different kind of 
record than what is traditionally treated as a record under the doctrine.  More-
over, probable cause must support a warrant for real-time CSLI because the 
SCA’s standard is ill-fitting in the circumstances that real-time CSLI is often 
sought. 
A.  Article I, Section 15 Is Broader on Its Face and Through Its Legis-
lative Purpose Than the Fourth Amendment 
The plain text of article I, section 15 includes a specific enumeration for 
“electronic communications and data,” language that is absent from the 
Fourth Amendment.124  In Missouri, constitutional provisions “are subject to 
the same rules of construction as other laws, except that constitutional provi-
sions are given a broader construction due to their more permanent charac-
ter.”125  Additionally, it must be assumed that every word “contained in a 
constitutional provision has effect, meaning, and is not mere surplusage.”126  
Generally, words are interpreted to “give effect to their plain . . . meaning.”127  
One of the accepted canons of statutory construction is an examination of the 
legislative development of the provision and related statutes.128 
Article I, section 15’s language, “electronic communications and data,” 
cannot be read to be “mere surplusage” because every word “contained in a 
constitutional provision” is given meaning and effect.129  To read article I, 
section 15 to be coextensive with the Fourth Amendment after its 2014 
amendment, however, does render “electronic communications and data” 
mere surplusage.  Article I, section 15 was read coextensively with the Fourth 
Amendment prior to article I, section 15’s amendment.130  So Missouri courts 
 
 124. Compare U.S. CONST. amend. IV, with MO. CONST. art. I, § 15. 
 125. Pestka, 493 S.W.3d at 408–09 (quoting Neske v. City of St. Louis, 218 
S.W.3d 417, 421 (Mo. 2007) (en banc)). 
 126. Id. at 409 (quoting State v. Honeycutt, 421 S.W.3d 410, 415 (Mo. 2013) (en 
banc)). 
 127. Id. (quoting Wright-Jones v. Nasheed, 368 S.W.3d 157, 159 (Mo. 2012) (en 
banc)). 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. (quoting Honeycutt, 421 S.W.3d at 415). 
 130. See State v. Lovelady, 432 S.W.3d 187, 190 (Mo. 2014) (en banc); State v. 
Grayson, 336 S.W.3d 138, 151 n.4 (Mo. 2011) (en banc).  Compare MO. CONST. art. 
I, § 15 (current), with MO. CONST. art. I, § 15 (1945). 
16
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understood the Fourth Amendment to either (1) not protect or (2) already 
protect “electronic communications and data.”  In either case, a post-
amendment coextensive reading of article I, section 15 would render “elec-
tronic communications and data” surplusage.  Such a reading is to be avoided 
under Missouri’s rules of construction.131  Therefore, article I, section 15 
must be broader in its scope of protections than the Fourth Amendment be-
cause Missouri changed its search and seizure language, which had previous-
ly mirrored the Fourth Amendment, to include a specific enumeration for 
“electronic communications and data,” and this change is to be given mean-
ing and effect.132 
This does not resolve, however, what the meaning and effect of those 
added protections are under article I, section 15.  To determine this, under 
Missouri’s rules of construction, “electronic communications and data” must 
be interpreted to give effect to the plain meaning, alongside an examination 
of the legislative development of the provision and related statutes.133 
“Electronic communications and data” is a broad category, the defini-
tion of which Missouri courts have not limited; nor has the legislature defined 
it.134  In the case of article I, section 15, the development of the ballot initia-
tive through the General Assembly offers little insight into the legislative 
meaning of “electronic communications and data” because the provision was 
adopted without substantial alteration.135  No other relevant state statute em-
 
 131. Prior to the passage of the 2014 amendment to article I, section 15, the court 
held the provision to be “coextensive with the Fourth Amendment; consequently ‘the 
same analysis applies under both provisions.’”  Lovelady, 432 S.W.3d at 190 (quoting 
Grayson, 336 S.W.3d at 143 n.2).  In 2015, the court discussed the issue of real-time 
CSLI and probable cause requirements.  State v. Hosier, 454 S.W.3d 883, 892 (Mo. 
2015) (en banc).  The discussion did not produce a relevant holding because the 
events of the case took place prior to the amendment; however, it did indicate that the 
court is well aware of the unresolved question.  Id.  The court discussed “[t]he issue 
of whether police must make a probable cause showing in order to obtain real-time 
cell phone location data” as one “frequently challenged,” but “[n]o Missouri state 
court has ruled on [the] issue.”  Id. 
 132. See Honeycutt, 421 S.W.3d at 414–15 (holding that the court’s “primary goal 
in interpreting Missouri’s constitution is to ‘ascribe to the words of a constitutional 
provision the meaning that the people understood them to have when the provision 
was adopted’” (quoting Farmer v. Kinder, 89 S.W.3d 447, 452 (Mo. 2002) (en 
banc))).  It follows that if prior to its amendment, article I, section 15 and the Fourth 
Amendment were coextensive, then following its amendment, article I, section 15 
extends beyond the protections of the Fourth Amendment.  The extent of these protec-
tions depends on what “meaning and intent” are given to “electronic communications 
and data.”  Id. 
 133. Pestka, 493 S.W.3d at 409. 
 134. Hosier, 454 S.W.3d at 892 n.6. 
 135. Compare S.J. Res. 27, 97th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2014) (pre-
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ploys the phrase “electronic communications and data.”136  With little help 
forthcoming from Missouri’s scant legislative history, it is helpful to look to 
federal statutes and other jurisdictions to determine what the legislature was 
intending to do. 
Under 18 U.S.C. § 2510, which the SCA relies on for definitions, an 
“electronic communication” is “any transfer of signs, signals, writing, imag-
es, sounds, data, or intelligence of any nature transmitted in whole or in part 
by a wire, radio, [or] electromagnetic . . . that affects interstate or foreign 
commerce[,] . . . [except] any communication from a tracking device.”137  It is 
possible to conclude that Missouri’s legislature, in contemplating an amend-
ment to its constitutional search and seizure provision, would have considered 
the federal scheme governing the search and seizure of electronic communi-
cations.  Further, it is reasonable that this definition was the one intended by 
the legislature when it proposed amending article I, section 15 to include pro-
tections for “electronic communication and data” because both provisions’ 
use of the term of art is in the context of search and seizure by a governmen-
tal entity. 
A look at other jurisdictions further supports an adoption of 18 U.S.C. § 
2510’s definition of “electronic communication.”  While Missouri was the 
first state to enshrine protections for digital privacy in its constitution, it was 
not alone in taking up Justice Alito’s suggestion for legislative action men-
tioned in his concurrence in United States v. Jones.138  Several other states 
have passed legislation affording protections to digital privacy.139  Two stat-
utes are noteworthy for the current discussion. 
First, Maine enacted an electronic privacy statute in 2014.140  The statute 
imposes a warrant requirement, supported by probable cause,141 on law en-
forcement when it is seeking to obtain location information, such as CSLI, of 
 
 136. An unrelated state regulation uses the phrase “electronic communications 
and data” in the context of defining a “statistical agent” as part of Missouri’s Life 
Insurance and Annuity Standards regulations.  MO. CODE REGS. ANN. tit. 20, § 400-
1.170(1)(C) (2017). 
 137. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(12) (2012).  A tracking device is defined as “an electronic 
or mechanical device which permits the tracking of the movement of a person or 
object.”  Id. § 3117(b). 
 138. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 427 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring). 
 139. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 644.21 (2017); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. 
art. 18.02 (West 2017); UTAH CODE ANN. § 63D-2-103 (West 2017); MINN. STAT. 
ANN. § 13.15 (West 2017); CAL. GOV’T CODE § 11019.9 (West 2017).  This list is not 
exhaustive. 
 140. Hanni Fakhoury, Why Wait for Congress? States Passing Electronic Privacy 
Legislations, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND.: DEEPLINKS (June 3, 2013), 
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/05/why-wait-congress-states-passing-electronic-
privacy-legislation.  See also 16 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 648 (2017). 
 141. 16 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 648. 
18
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 82, Iss. 2 [2017], Art. 9
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol82/iss2/9
2017] IT’S PROBABLE 501 
an electronic device.142  Second, California enacted its Electronic Communi-
cations Privacy Act, which likewise requires a showing of probable cause143 
upon issuance of a warrant to obtain electronic information.144  Under Cali-
fornia’s law, electronic information is defined as a class of data resulting 
from an electronic communication.145  California’s definition of electronic 
communication tracks the language of 18 U.S.C. § 2510.146 
In proposing a referendum to alter article I, section 15, Missouri likely 
shared the same understanding as California as to the meaning of “electronic 
communications” and its “data,” as both legislatures reacted to the same digi-
tal privacy concerns raised by United States v. Jones.147  Further, real-time 
CSLI should be held within the meaning of “communications data” because 
other similarly reacting legislatures, like Maine, specifically contemplated it 
to be a type of data identified as a concern by the Jones concurrences.148  
Finally, the canons of construction  under Pestka require a broad construction 
of article I, section 15 because of the “permanent character of constitutional 
provisions,” resulting in the incorporation of CSLI within the meaning of 
communication data.149 
A broad construction of “electronic communications and data” does not, 
however, necessarily overcome application of traditional constitutional ex-
ceptions to the warrant requirement for searches and seizures – such as the 
third-party disclosure doctrine.  To support the claim that a warrant supported 
by probable cause is required to obtain real-time CSLI, it must be shown that 
the third-party disclosure doctrine does not apply. 
 
 142. Maine’s statute was enacted the same year article I, section 15 of the Mis-
souri Constitution was amended.  See 16 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 648; see also 
MO. CONST. art I, § 15. 
 143. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1546.1(d)(2) (West 2017). 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. §§ 1546.1(c)–(d), (h). 
 146. Compare id. §§ 1546.1(c)–(d), (h), with 18 U.S.C. § 2510(12) (2012). 
 147. Indeed, legislators who advocated for the referendum’s passage expressly 
noted that the amendment would protect “private communications and data from 
being sent[ or] disclosed . . . to some other third party.”  See Cody Newill, Voter 
Guide to Missouri Constitutional Amendment 9, KCUR 89.3 (July 28, 2014), 
http://kcur.org/post/voter-guide-missouri-constitutional-amendment-9.  Sotomayor 
and Alito’s concerns about the third-party disclosure doctrine drove their discussion 
in United States v. Jones.  See supra Part III.A. 
 148. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 417 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).  
See also id. at 418–31 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 149. See Pestka v. State, 493 S.W.3d 405, 408–09 (Mo. 2016) (en banc). 
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B.  The Third-Party Disclosure Doctrine Does Not Apply to Real-Time 
CSLI Under Article I, Section 15 
The third-party disclosure doctrine is often used by law enforcement to 
obtain digital records held by cell phone companies.150  It has historically 
applied in two types of circumstances: those involving undercover informants 
and those involving third-party business records.151  A business record is “[a] 
report, memorandum, or other record made usually in the course of busi-
ness.”152  The business records class of circumstances is relevant in the CSLI 
context. 
Because real-time CSLI is qualitatively different than other business 
records accessible under the third-party disclosure doctrine, the doctrine 
should not apply to real-time CSLI under article I, section 15.153  This qualita-
tive difference was noted by Justices Alito and Sotomayor in Jones, along 
with Chief Justice Roberts in Riley.154 
In Riley v. California, the Supreme Court recognized for the first time 
the problems posed by allowing law enforcement to access cell phone data 
and records, including locational data.155  The Court outlined three distin-
guishing features that inform how courts analyze privacy issues relating to 
cell phones and records access.156  First, cell phones have many distinct types 
of information, including addresses, videos, and bank statements, that reveal 
more than any isolated record.157  Second, cell phones have a large capacity 
to store this varied information.158  Third, cell phones are more pervasive than 
any other type of device that stores records.159  The Court’s skepticism about 
giving law enforcement easy access to cell phone data and records resulted in 
a ruling that required law enforcement to obtain a warrant to search a cell 
phone because of the vast and potentially intimate nature of personal infor-
mation contained on cell phones.160  A search of a cell phone “bears little 
resemblance” to other types of physical searches, including those of homes, 
because cell phone data may be used to “reconstruct someone’s specific 
 
 150. Kerr, supra note 70, at 563. 
 151. Id. at 566. 
 152. Business record, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 153. Stanek, supra note 118. 
 154. In Jones, Justice Sotomayor notes this tension between the third-party doc-
trine and digital privacy issues.  United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 417–18 (2012) 
(Sotomayor, J., concurring).  See also Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2490 
(2014). 
 155. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2485. 
 156. Id. at 2489. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. at 2485. 
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movements down to the minute, not only around town but also within a par-
ticular building.”161 
The addition of “electronic communications and data” to article I, sec-
tion 15 may be interpreted as a response to the Court’s turn in Jones.  Scalia’s 
application of the trespassory test in Jones could be viewed as narrowing the 
Fourth Amendment protections to items enumerated in the Fourth Amend-
ment, including “persons, houses, papers, and effects.”  Writing for the ma-
jority, Justice Scalia argued that the privacy interest at issue during a search 
or seizure was to be narrowly analyzed as a property interest in the thing be-
ing searched.162  Scalia concluded that an unreasonable search had occurred 
during the GPS monitoring only because the GPS was placed on the defend-
ant’s wife’s property, her Jeep.163  This interference with the private property 
interest meant the search failed the trespassory test. 
But it is more likely that Jones will be remembered for its concurrences, 
where Justices Alito and Sotomayor wrote separately to express concern 
about the trespassory approach in the case of CSLI.164  Justice Sotomayor 
strongly advocated the reconsideration of the third-party disclosure doctrine, 
writing that it “is ill suited to the digital age, in which people reveal a great 
deal of information about themselves to third parties in the course of carrying 
out mundane tasks.”165 
Justice Alito noted that Scalia’s trespassory approach is problematic in 
the case of surreptitiously obtained cell phone data because there is no physi-
cal touching to satisfy trespass requirements, and the property interest is ten-
uous.166  Instead, Alito suggested that Congress was best fitted to resolve the 
Fourth Amendment problems presented by the confluence of new technolo-
gies, like smart phones.167  Seemingly on cue, Missouri reacted with its 
amendment to article I, section 15.  As a response to Jones, Missouri’s 
amendment to article I, section 15 expresses a clear and unambiguous policy 
to protect the ever-increasingly intimate nature of cell phone data and records.  
Modern cell phones provide stringent encryption capabilities and utilize bio-
metric software to protect the privacy of their owners.  These precautions 
indicate that both cell phone companies and users have a strong expectation 
of privacy regarding data associated with cell phones. 
Beyond the mere policy endorsement of Missourians, real-time CSLI is 
a qualitatively different type of record than what is often obtained under the 
 
 161. Id. at 2490.  The Court went on: “Indeed, a cell phone search would typically 
expose to the government far more than the most exhaustive search of a house: A 
phone . . . contains a broad array of private information never found in a home in any 
form – unless the phone is.”  Id. at 2491. 
 162. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 405 (2012). 
 163. Id. at 404–05. 
 164. Id. at 424–27 (Alito, J., concurring); see also id. at 414 (Sotomayor, J., con-
curring). 
 165. Id. at 417 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
 166. See supra note 105 and accompanying text. 
 167. Jones, 565 U.S. at 429–30 (Alito, J., concurring). 
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third-party disclosure doctrine because cell phone users do not voluntarily 
disclose CSLI in the same way that other business records are voluntarily 
disclosed.168  The differences between voluntary disclosure of CSLI and other 
business records accessed under the third-party disclosure doctrine are that 
(1) cell phones are nearly ubiquitous and (2) carried on a person nearly eve-
rywhere he or she goes, including inside the constitutionally protected area of 
the home.  This ubiquity results in real-time CSLI functioning more like a 
tracking device than a business record.  Cell phones emit signals by merely 
being turned on.  The voluntary act of turning on a phone and carrying it on 
one’s person seems quite different than signing a business record, such as a 
bank document.169 
Federal and state warrant procedures emphatically require a showing of 
probable cause to use a tracking device in criminal investigations.170  So if 
CSLI functions like a tracking device, then probable cause should be needed 
to support a warrant that seeks to obtain real-time CSLI. 
Under this view, real-time CSLI may not be sought under the SCA’s 
court order provision, which only requires a showing of “specific and articu-
lable facts” that the resulting evidence is likely to be relevant to an ongoing 
criminal investigation.171  The court order provision implicitly reads real-time 
CSLI to be like other business records excepted by the third-party disclosure 
doctrine.  But since real-time CSLI is more like a tracking device than a busi-
ness record, this method of going around the probable cause requirement 
should be foreclosed to law enforcement. 
This view is further buttressed when considering that the SCA expressly 
states that its lesser standard does not apply if in contravention to state law.172  
Since Missouri’s article I, section 15, a state law, encompasses real-time 
CSLI, probable cause should be shown to obtain real-time CSLI. 
 
 168. See, e.g., In re Application of U.S. for an Order Authorizing Disclosure of 
Location Info. of a Specified Wireless Tel., 849 F. Supp. 2d 526, 538 n.6 (D. Md. 
2011). 
 169. The inadequacy of the third-party disclosure doctrine is further highlighted 
when considering the emergence of the doctrine: “The third party and public exposure 
doctrines emerged at a time when modern surveillance capabilities were beyond im-
agination.  Today, these previously unimaginable technologies are not merely law 
enforcement tools; they are essential parts of our daily lives.”  Shaun B. Spencer, The 
Aggregation Principle and the Future of Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence, 41 NEW 
ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 289, 301 (2015). 
 170. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(d)(1). 
 171. See 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c) (2012). 
 172. The statute reads: “In the case of a State governmental authority, such a court 
order shall not issue if prohibited by the law of such State.”  Id. § 2703(d). 
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C.  The SCA’s “Specific and Articulable Facts” Standard Is Ill-Fitting 
for CSLI Obtainment 
Prior to Missouri’s amendment to its constitutional search and seizure 
provision, law enforcement was permitted under the SCA’s § 2703(c) to ob-
tain real-time CSLI on issuance of a warrant supported by the lesser standard 
of “specific and articulable facts” that the communication was relevant to an 
ongoing criminal investigation.  This standard was ill-fitting to CSLI from the 
beginning of the SCA, and article I, section 15’s realignment to the probable 
cause standard fits the surveillance tactic with an appropriate standard. 
The SCA’s “specific and articulable facts” standard was not invented by 
Congress.173  Instead, the language originated in the Supreme Court and has 
subsequently appeared in over seventy of their opinions.174  Relevant cases 
analyze the “reasonable suspicion” law enforcement must have to authorize a 
limited search of a person or location.175  The showing of “specific and ar-
ticulable facts” is typically made to justify a search after the fact.176  This 
alone makes the standard ill-fitting to real-time CSLI, which seeks to obtain 
future information rather than to justify a prior search.  If that were not 
enough, many of the cases allowing a search under a “specific and articulable 
facts” standard only permitted the search because of the imminent potential 
danger presented to law enforcement or because the search was conducted 
during the commission of an ongoing crime.177  Rarely is there an imminent 
potential danger presented to law enforcement during a search of real-time 
CSLI, and should such a case exist, the exigent-circumstances doctrine would 
apply.  Likewise, the exigent-circumstances doctrine would seem to apply if 
law enforcement knew that a cell phone owner was committing a felony.  
But, in such a case, law enforcement would have to possess an inhuman 
clairvoyance to predict crimes before they happen. 
 
 173. CLIFFORD S. FISHMAN & ANNE T. MCKENNA, WIRETAPPING AND 
EAVESDROPPING § 7:51.20 (2016). 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id.  See Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 334 (1990) (holding that protective 
sweep of home was authorized when police did not have probable cause or a warrant 
but could demonstrate a reasonable belief of specific and articulable facts that a po-
tential danger was posed to the police officers at the arresting scene).  See also Terry 
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 24 (1968) (holding that a pat down search was reasonable when 
law enforcement had a justified belief based on suspicious behavior that the arrested 
individual may pose a threat of danger). 
 176. FISHMAN & MCKENNA, supra note 173. 
 177. See Buie, 494 U.S. at 334 (holding that the Fourth Amendment permits law 
enforcement to conduct a protective sweep to search for an individual posing a danger 
to law enforcement officers or others); United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 227–
29 (1985) (holding that law enforcement may conduct a Terry stop when law en-
forcement believes that the person subject to the stop is involved in or is wanted in 
connection with a completed felony). 
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For these reasons, probable cause is the appropriate standard for a sur-
veillance tactic like monitoring real-time CSLI.  With the amendment to arti-
cle I, section 15, probable cause must now support a warrant to obtain real-
time CSLI.  
V.  CONCLUSION 
Legislatures across the country have responded vigorously to rising con-
cerns over digital privacy and locational data.  Many states have enacted stat-
utes that extend more protections for digital privacy.  In Missouri, these pro-
tections have extended to the search of real-time CSLI.  With its amendment 
to article I, section 15, Missouri has abrogated the application of the third-
party disclosure doctrine to real-time CSLI because CSLI is unlike typical 
records excepted from probable cause requirements under the doctrine.  Law 
enforcement that wishes to obtain real-time CSLI must now do so under a 
warrant supported by probable cause.  Not doing so will result in an unrea-
sonable search, which risks exclusion at trial of any obtained evidence during 
the search. 
24
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 82, Iss. 2 [2017], Art. 9
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol82/iss2/9
